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ABSTRACT 
Since 2012, there has been an increase of media attention on the Kurds, particularly 
women who are active in the YPJ and Peshmerga. Various publications have equated women’s 
militarization with women’s liberation. In an effort to more accurately measure this, the 
following question must be asked; what is the effect of women’s military involvement on 
women’s rights? Women that are active in both nationalist movements and traditional state 
armies are presented with changing gender roles. Post conflict, there is a struggle for women to 
transfer their newfound autonomy into political activism. The theory outlines a chain in which 
women participate in the armed forces, feel empowered, are able to obtain positions of influence, 
and create policy and social change. A break in any point of this chain will block female ex-
combatants from influencing women’s rights. The theory is tested on Kurdish women active in 
the Iraqi Peshmerga and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) in Syria. Data on women’s 
military participation and their impact on women’s rights was gathered from NGO reports, news 
articles, scholarly journals, and laws that were passed in Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria. The 
evidence gathered indicates that women’s military participation is not the only mechanism for 
improving women’s rights. While the development of gender equality in Northern Syria can be 
linked to women’s militarization, gender equality efforts in Iraqi Kurdistan do not have a direct 
link to women’s involvement in the Peshmerga. This work adds to the ongoing discussion on 
Kurdish political rights, particularly women's autonomy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in 2013, Western media outlets like BBC and Reuters started to cover stories 
of Kurdish women soldiers in the Peshmerga and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). 
Similarly, Vogue Italia featured a photo series of female Kurdish fighters in January of 2018, 
titled “Jin Jian Azadi”, which in Kurdish translates to “Women, Life, Freedom” (Hamad, 2018). 
The women that were featured were commonly described as being “badass”, “beautiful”, and in 
one case drew comparison to Angelina Jolie (Dehghanpishesh & Georgy 2016; Dirik, 2014; Gol, 
2016). The women included in these narratives provided inflammatory rhetoric against ISIS, 
threatening to “tear them apart” (Dehghanpishesh & Georgy, 2016).  
These firsthand accounts provide information on how Kurdish women are rising up and 
joining ranks, as well as offers insight into the motivations for women entering armed struggle. 
Although the articles provide insight into women’s positions in the military, they do little to 
describe the complete narrative on how Kurdish women are treated outside of battle. Therefore, 
these accounts do not question broader societal gender roles, and seemingly equate women’s 
military involvement with women’s liberation. This study poses the following questions: what 
are the effects of female militarization on women’s rights? Outside of the military, what do the 
rights of Kurdish women look like? If they are able to attain high-ranking military positions, can 
these roles transfer to the political and civilian sectors? To understand how women’s rights 
change through militarization, women’s roles must be studied beyond the battlefront. This 
research aims to bridge the gaps between the media coverage of Kurdish women as liberators 
and whether or not gender equality is being pursued in Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava.  
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Historically, war and conflict have been studied and understood through male 
experiences of militarization (Henshaw, 2015; Thomas & Bond, 2015). In addition to this, 
studies on the impact of war and conflict have traditionally excluded women (Blattman, 2009). 
However, the number of studies on women and militarization has grown since the mid 20th 
century (Di Leonardo, 1985; Segal, 1995). This research aims to reach beyond male ex-
combatants, and rather focuses on the challenges, experiences and changes that are unique to 
Kurdish women once they return from battle. Feminist scholars present two different approaches 
to female militarization. Antimilitarist feminists argue that militarization is rooted in patriarchy 
and therefore marginalizes women (Enloe 2000, Kirk 2018). Feminists that support women’s 
military participation argue that including women promotes them to the same level of citizenship 
as men and provides career opportunities (Feinman, 2000).  Beyond this, there are theories that 
believe that women’s military involvement can serve as an avenue for policy change, activism, 
and eventually observable improvements in women’s rights.  
The theory discussed in this study examines female militarization does not always 
translate into an improvement in women’s rights. This approach outlines a mechanism in which 
female ex-combatants pursue different initiatives to create change. By applying the theoretical 
framework to women in the Peshmerga and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), pursuits of 
gender equality among the Kurds are better understood. This research therefore attempts to 
clearly analyze women’s political and societal efforts, and whether or not they are creating 
choices and opportunities for women is actualized.  
Studying Kurdish women in particular offers several distinct advantages. This is a 
population that is not constricted by formal state structures, so there are less variables regarding 
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the creation of women’s organizations and changing gender roles. The findings of the study 
suggest that the process of women’s liberation is drastically different between the Kurds of Iraq 
and the Kurds of Syria. The process of inclusion of women in the Peshmerga as well as in public 
life in Iraqi Kurdistan has been far more gradual than the changing roles of women in northern 
Syria; otherwise known as Rojava. There is greater support for the claim that there is a women’s 
revolution in Rojava as compared to Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the ongoing changes for women’s 
rights in each of these regions, there is room for improvement for pursuits of gender equality.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
The use of women in different militaries can be examined across cultures throughout 
history. Despite female militarization being an ancient practice, scholarship on the societal effect 
of women in combat roles is relatively new. The scholarship that currently exists and continues 
to develop can be seen across studies in political science, sociology, anthropology and women’s 
and gender studies. In both established militaries and rebel groups, women are useful in a 
symbolic way. Even if women are used for symbolism in a military, they are still able to use new 
skills and autonomy to influence change post conflict. Women that are active in rebel groups, 
however, may not be able to as easily translate their new skills into post conflict society. In both 
recognized and unrecognized states, the ability to influence policy and therefore make changes 
are largely dependent on what policy and state-building frameworks are accessible to women. 
The literature review will examine several different groups and sub-groups. First, 
women’s military participation in established states will be discussed. This serves as a baseline 
for comparing and understanding women in rebel movements. Literature on methods of policy 
change, specifically among women and ex-combatants, are also part of this review. The actors in 
this study are female ex-combatants, so these two categories serve to show how other women 
and other ex-combatants work to influence policy. 
 The impact of women’s military participation on gender equality in established states 
varies. The literature indicates that although some states may use women for their own 
recruitment purposes, there are cases in which female ex-combatants can use their new skills to 
their advantage. There is less variation, however, in non-state armies. Many of these movements 
fail to include women in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process post 
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conflict. Regarding women in policy activism, whether male legislators support women in 
politics can impact women’s political mobility. In ex-combatant policy activism, the literature 
implies that ex-combatants are an underutilized resource in the DDR process.  
 
 
Women’s Military Participation in Established States 
Established state militaries offer opportunities for women to enter conflict. The motives 
for state militaries that use women are sometimes questioned, and are criticized for only using 
women to garner “patriotic zeal”, yet will demobilize them once there is an actual outbreak of 
conflict (Enloe, 1980). The white women that were used in the South African Defense were used 
to symbolize white unity, and served in a subordinate nature that failed to destroy “patriarchal 
authority relations” (Unterhalter, 1987; Cock, 1994). The United States Army in the 1970s 
enlisted women to meet recruitment goals. Women were not a necessity ten years later, and so 
the military closed off specialties for women that had been already completed training for 
(Stiehm, 1989). In other cases, women that serve in the military are able to make a broader 
societal influence afterward. Women that serve in the Israeli Defense Forces have voiced 
criticism of the IDF and engaged in political protests. (Sasson-Levy et al., 2011). Women’s 
protests as soldiers offers a new perspective to women’s antiwar movements that states cannot 
ignore (Sasson-Levy et al. 2011). During conflict, women can begin to develop skills that are 
then utilized following war. Women in the Chinese military have served in noncombatant roles 
and have experienced personal benefits from exposure to education and training opportunities 
(Li, 1993).  
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Despite some of the advantages that women are able to gain, there are still roadblocks 
that women face in state military integration. Women in armed forces still have limited 
representation in higher-ranking posts as well as traditional combatant roles (Carreiras, 2006). In 
Canada, the military and the use of women is not reflected in civilian life. The Canadian military 
is still largely based off of a patriarchal frame, and is therefore resistant to women being treated 
as equals within the military (Winslow and Dunn, 2002). Even in societies that provide the 
structures and support necessary for women, particularly ex-combatants, these resources are not 
always taken advantage of. It was found that within the United States, female ex-combatants 
were less likely than men to take advantage of Veterans Affairs centers (Segal and Lane, 2002). 
These established state militaries offer different opportunities, levels of involvement for 
women and therefore different outcomes. Militaries are still largely based off of patriarchal 
frames, yet women are still included and somewhat integrated. Women that are active in state 
militaries are overall able to develop new skillsets, regardless of the intentions of state militaries 
including them. Although women are able to be active in state militaries, they do not always 
have broader impact on the rest of society. Further examining why women’s military 
participation does not always translate to broader participation is important to study because it 
answers several questions. Research on women’s military participation illustrates both how war 
impacts women and how women impact war. By understanding this, researchers and 
policymakers can implement policies and initiatives that secure women’s rights post conflict.  
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Women in Rebel Movements 
The examples previously mentioned discuss established state militaries, and therefore 
greatly differ from non-state militant groups. Non-state militant groups, especially nationalist 
movements, have used women in their operations. Out of seventy different rebel movements that 
have been active since 1990, women were active in 60 percent of them (Henshaw, 2015). They 
are therefore worth studying separately from established state actors. National liberation 
movements like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Irish Republican Army offered 
more opportunities for women’s military involvement than the nation states that these groups 
fought in. Despite these movements providing positions for women, individual men within these 
groups are less likely to want women to gain equal status (Alison, 2004). Women have also been 
used in Bolshevik Combat units, the Chinese Revolution, Vietnamese Revolutions, and the 
Lebanese Civil War (Enloe, 1980). Aside from nationalist movements, women have been 
involved in non-nationalist rebel groups. During the Nepalese Civil War, about 40 percent of the 
Maoist cadres were women (Fontanella-Khan, 2009). The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) also used female combatants. The FARC was attractive to female recruits 
because it presented not only an escape from discrimination, but also a way of securing equality 
(Stanski, 2006). Post conflict Namibia had weak policies for reintegrating ex-combatants, 
particularly those that were either disabled or female (Dzinesa, 2007).     
It can be argued that women were seen as an invaluable resource for a strive toward 
independence, yet broader women’s issues were not a true concern of these movements. Instead, 
nationalist groups have used women’s support during times of struggle, yet have faced criticism 
for failing to meet women’s demands (Scarnecchia, 1996). Enloe (1989, 44) asserts that 
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nationalism has “sprung up from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and 
masculinized hope.” This means that when a conflict reaches its end, the image and rhetoric that 
were once used to recruit women return to fit a “patriarchal, heterosexual familial model” 
(Sunindyo, 1998 p. 3). After demobilization in Sierra Leone, male rebels were encouraged to 
enlist in the Sierra Leone Army, but female ex combatants did not receive this form of 
legitimacy (Coulter, 2009). Women that were active soldiers in Sierra Leone were largely left out 
of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process post conflict because their roles as 
soldiers were largely ignored (MacKenzie, 2009).  
In other cases, women are able to make an impact in liberation movements, yet their 
social status post conflict regresses to the way it was before the conflict began. After the civil 
war in El Salvador, some FMLN female ex-combatants became activists within the FMLN 
political party, or as elected officials in town councils (Viterna, 2013). Female ex-combatants 
who did not take these roles either returned to their traditional pre-conflict wars or lacked 
opportunities despite feeling empowered (Viterna, 2013). Women who attempted to challenge 
gender roles during and post conflict were met with public backlash, serving as an incentive to 
avoid the public eye and not to pursue political activity (Pankhurst, 2012). Similarly, women that 
were in the EPLF in Eritrea experienced a never before seen level of equality, yet were faced 
with challenges when they returned from conflict (Rolston, 2010). Girls as young as age twelve 
that have been recruited as soldiers will return to their families “newly assertive and 
independent”, yet will have little economic opportunities (McKay, 1998). Female ex combatants 
in Eritrea were not able to wed after combat, as they were criticized for being “too emancipated” 
(Rolston, 2007).  
  9 
When legal processes do allow for the inclusion of women, the desired effects are not 
always carried out into practice. Despite women parliamentary candidates making electoral gains 
in post conflict Rwanda and Uganda, ordinary women were still subject to rape and violence 
(Moran, 2010). Female ex-combatants are typically overlooked in disarmament, demobilization, 
reintegration and transitional justice processes. These programs limit women to traditional 
gender roles and deter female ex combatants from participating in them (Ortega, 2010). Ortega 
(2010) argues that further research on female ex combatants and a stronger government focus on 
reintegrating women in post conflict is needed in these cases. However, there are cases within 
Africa in which post conflict, quota systems were established for women’s involvement. Tripp 
(2015) found that 76 percent of post conflict countries implemented a quota system for women, 
in comparison of 58 percent of non-conflict countries doing the same. This serves as another 
example of conflict impacting and restructuring gender roles.  
The Zapatista movement during 1990’s Mexico did provide outlets and resources for 
women (Castillo, 2002). Women’s involvement in the Chiapas Rebellion changed the face of 
Mexican feminism that was emerging at the time to include indigenous women (La Botz, 1999). 
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was able to gain political influence and use 
it to the advantage of women. The EZLN promulgated the Women’s Revolutionary Law, which 
granted women the right to choose their husbands and how many children they wanted to have. 
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was a rebel movement that used female soldiers 
who later were able to build businesses and gain influence within civil society (Utas, 2005). Women take on untraditional roles by fighting in conflict, but even civilian women are impacted 
by ongoing war. Wood (2008, p. 539) outlines “political mobilization, military socialization, 
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polarization of social identities, militarization of local authority, transformation of gender roles 
and fragmentation of the local political economy” as social processes occurring during war.  
As earlier stated in the literature reviewed, women in armed non-state militaries have 
different experiences than women who are involved in established state militaries. This research 
contributes the assessment that the lack of political structure facing nationalist rebel movements 
creates a unique space for women. When conflict rises, rhetoric is used to recruit them, yet post 
conflict female ex combatants are not likely to be able to make societal gains. One of the ways in 
which female ex-combatants will try to create societal gains is through pursuing policy change. 
Studying policy change strategies used by female ex-combatants bridges the gap between women 
participating in conflict, gaining skills, and then applying them to the political sphere.  
 
 
Methods of Policy Change After military service, women who feel empowered and able will likely try to pursue social change. One of the mechanisms that can make this possible is engaging in policy change. It is therefore crucial to understand how methods of policy change compare between different groups. For the purpose of this study, female ex-combatants are examined. Thus, the following sections will discuss a broad overview of policy change followed by discussions on women in policy change and ex-combatants in policy change.   According to Hugh Heclo, policy change results from not only large scale social and 
economic change, but from interactions between people within a policy community (Sabatier, 
1988). Therefore, it is crucial to study the actions of individuals in these groups. By examining 
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the methods in which actors influence these changes, women’s activism and pursuits for social 
change during peacetime can be understood. This serves as a frame of reference for how war and 
women’s military participation can influence these mechanisms.  
The methods of policy change that are pursued by activists vary between governments. 
Several examples of policy change include street level bureaucrats, policy entrepreneurs, and 
policy brokers. Street level bureaucrats are defined as individuals who represent the government 
in their interactions with people (Lipsky, 1969). Policy entrepreneurs are individuals who are 
within the policy process, and who use their own resources in hopes of influencing a specific 
policy proposal (Shearer, 2015). Christopoulos (2006) emphasizes that policy entrepreneurs are 
limited by policy networks. He also asserts that actors with low political capital will engage in 
high risk actions, yet actors with high political capital can pursue long term, low risk policies. 
Policy brokers are members of coalitions that attempt to find mediation between two groups 
pursuing different policies (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). Sørensen (2002) introduces the 
concept that the relationship between politics and administration is dynamic and subject to 
continuous renegotiation. These theories of policy change can be broadly applied to different 
states and different actors. The following sections will narrow this focus onto women and ex-
combatants.  
 
 
Women in Policy Change 
Studying how women in general may influence policy change serves as a baseline to 
compare how female ex-combatants policy change pursuits compare. Additionally, examining 
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women’s efforts toward policy change offers general insights into women’s successes and failures in this area. Goetz (2005) discusses five different forms that women’s policy agencies 
adopt. These agencies may be advocacy or advisory units, policy monitoring units, units with 
implementation responsibilities, or commissions with investigation powers. Important to note is 
that the inclusion of women in government is not the only determining factor in an increase in 
pro-women legislation. Other important factors include the support of male legislators and the 
relationship between female legislators that actors in civil society and aid efforts (Wang, 2013). 
International norms, pressure from civic movements, and actions taken by individuals all have 
the potential to influence policy (Htun, 2016). Despite the impact of these factors, international 
organizations have used inclusion of women in parliament as a measure for a country’s progress 
toward gender equality. What results, argues Htun (2016) is the inclusion of women without true 
representation. 
The methods of influencing policy previously outlined imply a socially structured 
relationship between individuals and their government. The creation of post-conflict policy, 
however, presents new challenges. Policy makers must decide whether or not ex-combatants 
should be treated as a separate interest group (Kingma, 1997). Beyond this, reintegration of 
women, and therefore including them in these policies, can lead to tensions within communities 
(Kingma, 1997). The scope of these assertions is limited, as socially structured relationships can 
only be applicable to established, internationally recognized states. Therefore, there are 
important questions to be asked regarding the relationship between individuals and states that are 
not internationally recognized. Literature on rebel groups and non-state armies offer insights into 
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some of these questions. One group worthy of studying in this framework are ex-combatants and 
their efforts for policy change.  
 
 
Ex-Combatants in Policy Change 
There is recent literature that suggests that ex-combatants are a resource for policy 
building and social change (Friðriksdóttir, 2018). Sonpar (2008) discusses an “activist 
orientation” exhibited by ex-militants in Jammu and Kashmir. She argues that the subjects in her 
study show the potential that ex-militants have for activism and peace building. The United 
Nations is known for its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration initiatives, commonly 
referred to as DDR (United Nations Peacekeeping). Ex-combatants influencing policy change 
falls under reintegration. According to Özerdem (2002, p. 962), “reintegration is the process 
whereby former combatants and their families and other displaced persons are assimilated into 
the social and economic life of (civilian) communities.” Reintegrating ex-combatants into 
politics is an important part of the DDR process to ensure that they do not feel a need to return to 
arms (Bowd & Özerdem, 2013).  
The DDR process has resulted in various successes and failures. A study in Uganda 
found that forced recruitments into the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) were more likely to vote 
and be community leaders (Blattman, 2009). The abductees interviewed “described, after return, 
a sense of power over their lives and events” (Blattman, 2009, p. 243). This implies that ex-
combatants experience life altering events that make them more politically active. With this 
being said, female ex-combatants do not always experience the same agency.  Ortega and Maria 
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(2010) question the inclusion of female ex-combatants in the DDR process. They state that DDR 
programs often encourage the “return of women to the domestic and private sphere” (Ortega & 
Maria, 2010, p. 2).  
Examining theories of policy change offers insights into how individual actors pursue 
policy change within formal recognized states. Unrecognized states and national liberation 
movements are subject to rapidly changing social structures. The motives of the different armed 
forces as well as the political avenues and structures that are present for women greatly impact 
what roles women will serve in larger society once they return from combat. The goal of this 
study is to establish linkages between women’s military service and changes in women’s rights 
and roles. Therefore, the following section outlines a theoretical framework explaining why 
women’s militarization does not always lead to an increase in women’s rights.   
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THEORY 
 
 As previously discussed, there are both rebel movements and state militaries that employ 
women as soldiers. However, using women in militaries is not enough in itself to lead to 
improvements in women’s rights. Instead, there are a series of steps that must be taken for policy 
change regarding women to take place. The theory tests the assertions made by scholars that 
Feinman (2000, p. 12) refers to as “feminist egalitarian militarists”.  These scholars treat 
participation as a mechanism for an increase in women’s rights within that society. This can be 
observed in a few recognized states, but there are fewer examples in unrecognized states. This 
research aims to establish that women’s military participation does not always lead to increased 
rights within unrecognized states. Unrecognized states are subject to new and developing 
systems of government, and are not limited by a political class system like established states.  
In order to appreciate the different roles that women have in these two structures, it is 
important to note the differences between recognized and unrecognized states. Unrecognized 
states are defined as lacking international recognition, having an aspiration for independent 
status as a state, and have control of some territory (Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011). Because of 
this, unrecognized states have different motives and norms within the international system. They 
are subject to new and developing systems of government, and are not limited by a formalized 
political system like established states. These differences between recognized and unrecognized 
states apply to the use of women in their militaries as well.  Unrecognized states are not bound 
by pre-existing state structures. Therefore, they provide an environment in which there are 
seemingly less formal restraints on women than in recognized states. One would then expect a 
greater impact of women’s military participation in this environment. Women have been active 
  16 
in armed forces of unrecognized states. Specifically examining states that are not internationally 
recognized offers a framework in which the impact of female military participation can be 
observed. 
As discussed by King (2001), unrecognized states in Eurasia have been able to defeat 
recognized powers and create their own state structures. These structures that are created differ 
greatly from established states. In Somaliland, the clan-based system of government ensures 
survival and stability. This comes at the expense of the women of Somaliland, who would 
benefit more from a liberal democracy rather than a clan based government. In the Puntland 
region of Somalia, clan leaders indirectly elect government officials, leading to women being 
disenfranchised (Johnson and Smaker 2014). Looking at these examples, it can be seen that 
whether women make societal gains after conflict varies between recognized and unrecognized 
states.  
To understand why women’s military participation in unrecognized states usually does 
not lead to increased rights in unrecognized sets, the path from participation in the armed forces 
to changes in policy must be examined. Participation in the armed forces will enact political 
change through the following series of steps. First, women participate in the armed forces. Then, 
upon surviving war, ex combatants must feel empowered. Following this, there should be 
societal opportunities for civic engagement. Women then use these positions to affect change or 
influence policy. Finally, these societal outcomes that have been promoted by female leaders 
should actually occur. There are cases in which the steps outlined below were followed, and 
therefore policy change took place.  This chain captures the efforts that women make in order to 
be politically and socially represented within their society. Although there might be latent ways 
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in which women enact change, this framework accounts for intentional actions in which women 
seek to enact change. Therefore, a break in any of these links will prevent female ex-combatants 
from enacting intentional societal or political change. 
 
Figure 1: Linkages for female ex-combatants creating social change 
  
As demonstrated by the flowchart, the first step in the relationship is women’s 
participation in the armed forces. For the purpose of this paper, participation in the armed forces 
refers to women in combat roles. Although women have been used historically in auxiliary and 
supporting roles, it is important to separately study the impact of women as soldiers (Gjelsvik, 
2010). The integration of women into the military has disrupted the structure of the organization 
that they are fighting for, so their ultimate return to their communities will also result in change.  
 The next step in the pathway to enacting policy change is that ex combatants feel 
empowered. It is assumed that after surviving conflict, women return to either their previous 
societies or are transplanted into a new one. After serving in conflict, the military roles that they 
were in have led them to feel capable and motivated to be a part of societal change. A feeling of 
empowerment may be difficult to measure, but it can be examined by the attitudes and actions of 
female ex combatants. It can be assumed that women who return from conflict as recluses are not 
Participation in the armed forces Ex combatants feel empowered
Societal opportunities for engagement
Tangibly attaining positions of influence
Using positions to affect change or influence policy Policy and social change
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empowered. Returning combatants who are able to readjust to their new lives and take an active 
interest in their surroundings and political processes are empowered.  
 After women survive conflict and feel empowered, there should be societal opportunities 
for civic engagement. These opportunities for civic engagement act as a mechanism for newly 
empowered women to feel comfortable with using their new identity to pursue a greater cause. 
These opportunities can be in the civil sector, activist focused, or in government. Opportunities 
for women’s civic engagement may have existed before conflict, but militarization of women 
should lead to an increase in awareness of women’s issues, and therefore an increase in positions 
for women. This includes the government having quotas to include women.  
 Once opportunities for civic engagement are determined to be present, women must act 
on these opportunities and attain a position of influence. Even if opportunities are present within 
a government, women may face obstacles in attaining positions. For positions of political 
influence, like parliament or public office, candidates must be elected. Women may not be 
elected for a number of reasons, given that a majority of the electorate may not agree with their 
platform. Another underlying possibility for women not being able to enter public office are 
sexist attitudes of the general population. Outside of government, opportunities for civic 
engagement will exist in civil movements and non-governmental organizations. Women hoping 
to join these movements must either be hired, appointed, or be recruited as a volunteer. The 
ability and frequency of women to be chosen for civilian based movements indicate civilian 
attitudes toward female ex combatants.  
 In the event that women are able to attain a position of influence, they must use their 
positions to affect change or influence policy. Whether they are active in a nongovernmental 
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organization or in public office, female ex combatants have the potential to use their role to 
affect change. Women who hold public office may not fully utilize their influence to enact 
change in an effort to appease their voter base. Similarly, women who are activists may feel 
either pessimistic or that their society is not yet ready to embrace changes in gender relations.  
 The final result of the flow of women’s military participation is political and social 
change. Once women return from war, feel empowered and are able to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented, new legislation must be passed. It is assumed that female ex combatants 
that are integrated into civil and political processes will vote in favor of policies that will benefit 
women. For this outcome, it is not enough for laws to merely be passed. Regarding political 
change specifically, the laws that are passed must be applied to the population. Although legal 
frameworks may serve as a basis for increased rights for women, they must be enforced for 
observable societal change to occur. 
These linkages are required for policy change. If there is a break at any point in the 
flowchart, policy change will be less likely to occur. The second linkage, “feeling empowered” is 
a precondition for the study. This can be applied to women who leave combat positions, or 
women who are ushered in to new leadership roles. This link can be easily broken as it is applied 
individually to women. Therefore, individual factors such as personality and marital status may 
impact whether or not a women feels empowered. Women not feeling empowered would be 
observable in women voluntarily returning to the positions and status that they held before they 
entered conflict. Female ex-combatants who are not empowered will not join communities or 
participate in activist efforts. Alternatively, women who are placed in new leadership roles may 
feel disillusioned with the cause that they initially aligned themselves with.  
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The previously established precondition, feelings of empowerment, alone is not enough for 
female ex-combatants to be able to influence or change policy. Rather, for engagement should be 
available for these feelings to be translated into efforts for change. If women cannot hold 
political office or hold jobs, then they are ultimately left without a medium to pursue social 
change.   
H1: If female ex-combatants do not attain positions of influence, then they are less likely 
to influence or change policy 
Gaining a position of influence is also a step that may not be actualized. These positions can be 
in the government sector, private sector, politics, or non-profit work. These roles all serve as 
mechanisms for women to be in leadership roles. Conservative attitudes about gender roles may 
block women from filling these roles. Another reason for a lack of women in these positions is 
that in many nationalist movements, the building of the state is seen as a main priority, leaving 
women’s issues to be ignored (Mojab and Gorman, 2007). Even if women are able to make gains 
during revolution, these new roles and positions may fade once conflict is resolved (Tank, 2017). 
This allows for the public to ignore or overlook women as prospective job candidates or political 
candidates.  
 H2: If female ex-combatants in positions of influence lack societal opportunities for 
engagement or are not included in policy change discussions, then they are less likely to 
influence or change policy 
Even in the instance that women are able to gain influential positions, they may hesitate to 
translate their power into policy change. Elected officials may not favor radical changes in hopes 
of being reelected or in fear of receiving backlash. Similarly, it is possible that women who are 
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newly employed may be excluded from important decisions. This hypothesis aims to measure 
not the number of women in the job sector and in political office, but rather the women who are 
able to translate their positions into change. Whether or not women are included in political 
discussions and processes reflects the attitudes of the male politicians that they work with.  
Women who serve in noncombat support roles in militaries will have different 
experiences within the military. These support roles offer a more traditional route for women to 
be involved militarily. Women were typically limited to nursing or secretarial positions, which 
reflect gender stereotypes from the civilian sector (Quester, 1977). While the roles of combatants 
and non-combatants may differ, societal attitudes toward these women post conflict are 
sometimes very similar. In the case of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 
Lanka, women that served in either of these roles were not seen as suitable wives post-conflict 
(Alison, 2004). Despite these similar societal expectations, this research questions whether 
female combatants and non-combatants actually have different experiences post conflict. Ex-
combatants obtain untraditional roles in a military, so it is worth questioning whether their 
training and military service sets them apart from noncombatant women. What this study aims to 
look at is the impact of women adopting new, untraditional combat roles and how this impacts 
women’s rights.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
In testing the theory, two cases will be discussed. These cases will examine the use of 
women in two different militaries; the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Women’s Protection 
Units (YPJ) in Northern Syria. The formation of the Peshmerga dates back to 1943, but they did 
not receive international attention until they helped overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Lortz 
2012). Although the PKK has been active in Syria, The YPJ as well as the People’s Protection 
Units (YPG) in Syria were not formed until 2012. The creation of these units was brought on by 
the Rojava revolution. Figures vary across reports, but there are estimates that out of the 150,000 
Peshmerga fighters, about 1,700 of them are women (Rudaw, 2017; Szoldra, 2017). Between the 
YPG and the YPJ however, these numbers are more even, as women are estimated to make up 
24,000 of the total combined 60,000 fighters (Perry, 2017) 
Studying the use of women in Kurdish militaries and the effect of women’s rights in Iraqi 
Kurdistan and Northern Syria are worth looking into for multiple reasons. More broadly, these 
two cases offer insights into the roles of women in rebel groups and unrecognized states as 
opposed to traditional state actors. Also, Kurdish militaries are especially relevant to study given 
the attention of the international community and western media on their use of women. 
Therefore, this research adds to two ongoing scholarly debates; the first being women’s 
militarization in non-state groups, and the second being gender roles in Iraqi Kurdistan and 
Northern Syria. To fully understand the present day relationship between female militarization 
and women’s rights among the Kurds, it is crucial to discuss the history of Kurdish nationalism, 
Kurdish female leaders, and women within the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).  
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The Kurds 
The debate over the prospect of Kurdish statehood, commonly referred to as the “Kurdish 
Question” has been present since the early 20th century. Following World War I, the 1920 Treaty 
of Sèvres was drafted. The treaty included plans for a Kurdish state, but it was not ratified. 
Instead, the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified in 1923, which blocked the creation of a Kurdistan. 
This left the Kurds without a state, and are now spread across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. As a 
result, the Kurdish language, customs and traditions were repressed. In Turkey, Kurds were 
referred to as “mountain Turks” and the names of Kurdish villages were changed to Turkish 
(Gunter, 1988). 
Studying Kurdish women’s military service in relation to women’s rights and gender 
roles is incredibly salient. Although the Kurds as a group have been the subject of a growing 
collection of literature since the early 2000s, much remains to be learned about Kurdish women, 
particularly militant ones. Insights gained from studying women in the Peshmerga and the YPJ 
extend beyond just Kurdish issues. Rather, this research can easily be applied to feminist studies 
along with scholarship regarding nationalism and militarization.  
 
 
Kurdish Women and the PKK 
When examining Kurdish women and their current roles in Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan, 
the formation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is crucial to understand. The PKK was 
founded by Abdullah Öcalan in Turkey in 1978. The PKK’s mission was to “make a communist 
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revolution by guerilla warfare, and establish a separate Kurdish state” (Criss, 1995, p 18). 
Women were active in the PKK from its very beginning. Kesire Yildirim, Öcalan’s ex-wife, was 
one of the first women to support the PKK. Their failed marriage heavily influenced Öcalan’s 
ban on marriage and sexual relationships for PKK militants (Marcus, 2007). A few years after its 
establishment, the PKK targeted Mehmet Celal Bucak, a parliamentarian with right wing ties, for 
political assassination. The attempt failed, but it nonetheless served its goal in declaring the 
establishment of the PKK (Marcus, 2007).  
In 1984, the PKK declared war against the Turkish state. Sakine Cansiz, another woman 
in the PKK, was active during this time. She was eventually imprisoned for eleven years, but led 
a Kurdish protest movement in prison. After her release in the early 1990s, Cansiz began 
organizing the women’s movement within the PKK in Iraq (Letsch, 2013). This is when women 
started joining the PKK in significant numbers (Tezcür, 2019). At first, the PKK was not 
logistically able to accept so many women, but they needed more combatants for warfare 
(Tezcür, 2019). Not long after joining in mass numbers, women started to take leadership 
positions. In 1996, Zeynap Kinaci, a female PKK member, carried out the group’s first suicide 
attack. She blew herself up in a Turkish military parade, injuring 30 people and killing ten 
soldiers (Bayar, 2019). 
Three years after the PKK’s first suicide bombing, Öcalan was captured and imprisoned 
by Turkish special forces in Kenya. Despite his imprisonment, Öcalan is still an influential figure 
in the PKK, as he continues to release public statements. Ideologically, Öcalan has moved away 
from advocating for a Kurdish state. Instead, he has proposed “a new ‘truly’ democratic Turkish 
republic, and a project of democratic confederalism” (Akkaya & Jongerden, 2011, p 151).  
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Regarding Öcalan’s changing ideology, the writings of Murray Bookchin were incredibly 
influential. In the 1980s, Bookchin, a former Stalinist, started developing ideas for “an 
ecological, democratic society” (Biehl, 2012). He was anti-statist and advocated for small-scale 
democratic assemblies to make decisions for a community. Öcalan began seeing nation-states as 
oppressors, therefore adopting Bookchin’s approach of democratic confederalism rather than 
calling for the creation of a Kurdish state (Cemgil & Hoffmann, 2016).  Öcalan (2013, p. 26) 
went so far as to claim that “housewifization is the oldest form of slavery.” What is commonly 
referred to as the “Rojava Experiment” is a continuation of what Abdullah Öcalan began within 
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PKK has been connected to Syrian Kurds 
since the late 1980’s (Marcus, 2007).   
Öcalan’s public statements and his writings both reflect a commitment to women’s 
liberation. He even declared the PKK as a “women’s party” in 1998 (Damon, 2008).  Öcalan 
argues that along with its nationalist goals, the PKK “struggled against internal feudalism in 
order to change the status of women and end the enslavement of society in general.” (Öcalan, 
2013 p. 40) 
 
 
Kurdish Women in Power  
Outside of the PKK, there is a deep history of Kurdish women as leaders. As early as the 
1600s, there were female tribe chieftains. In the 1850s, Kara Fatima Khanum acted as the 
chieftan of her tribe following her husband’s imprisonment. She became famous in Europe for 
commanding a Kurdish contingent during the Crimean War. Similarly, Adela Khanun was the 
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wife of a chieftain and governor within the Ottoman government during the 20th century. She had 
gardens and bazaars built, transforming her village of Halabja into a major trade center. Possibly 
one of the most famous cases of a Kurdish woman gaining political influence can be seen in 
Layla Zana. Like many powerful women before her, she was the wife of a Kurdish political 
leader. When her husband was imprisoned, she turned to political activism. She eventually was 
elected into Turkish parliament. In 1994, she was sentenced to prison for contacts with the PKK. 
Through her political activism, Zana has solidified herself as an international symbol for Kurdish 
nationalism (van Bruinessen, 2001). 
With all of these examples in mind, it is important to note that these were all women in 
aristocratic circles. There are comparatively far fewer examples of Kurdish women in power who 
weren’t born into or married into influential families. It is undeniable, however, that these 
women yielded tremendous power and influence, particularly Leyla Zana. It would therefore be a 
mistake to give Öcalan all of the credit for spearheading women’s liberation. In fact, van 
Bruinessen (2001, p 15) makes the argument that Leyla Zana rather than Abdullah Öcalan is  
“the closest to Nelson Mandela that the Kurds have.”  
 
 
Outcome of Interest  
The creation of pro-woman policy, as well as women’s rights in both Kurdistan and 
Northern Syria are the outcomes of interest for this study. Pro-woman policy will be defined as 
statutes and laws that are concerned with women’s political and social equality. For this study, 
women’s rights will refer to the practice of female genital mutilation child marriages, and 
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women’s political participation. Female genital mutilation, child marriage and women’s political 
participation are all appropriate measures for women’s rights. Legislation that has been passed 
by the Kurdistan Regional Government as well as the New Charter of Rojava are against these 
acts, making them logical choices to use to study whether rights have been improved or not. 
Beyond whether or not laws are passed, the implementation of theses policies will also be 
studied. To determine this, data on programs that work to educate and enforce policies are part of 
this research. To examine women’s rights, data on female genital mutilation and child marriages 
will be obtained by reading human rights reports from nongovernmental organizations. 
Additionally, women’s involvement in the development of policies will also be examined.  
 
  
Possible Drivers of Outcome 
 In this study, the possible drivers of outcomes will be lack of women’s empowerment, women’s inability access to positions of influence, as well as the inability of women to use these positions to implement change. Women’s military participation will be measured by 
examining how many women are in military combat roles. This study will exclude women that 
are involved in noncombat related support roles. Each intervening linkage between women’s 
armed military participation and the outcome of women’s policy change will also be treated as 
an independent variable. 
Many female representatives of Kurdish Parliament rely on nominations by male party 
leaders, leading them to reflect the party’s wishes rather than initiating change (Kaya, 2017). 
Reading news reports and legal documents on what legislation has passed through parliament 
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will provide information on which parliamentarians supported or opposed different acts. If 
female parliamentarians do not vote in favor of legislation that is in favor of increasing women’s 
rights, then it can be stated that they do not use their position to gain policy outcomes. 
 
 
Alternative Explanations for Outcome of Interest 
There are lingering questions about the motivations for policies being passed in Rojava 
and Iraqi Kurdistan regarding women. One possibility for why Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan focus 
on women’s rights is an effort for approval from foreign countries. Because Rojava is only de 
facto independent and Iraqi Kurdistan is semi-autonomous, the backing of the international 
community does carry some weight. Important to note is the United States’ role in supporting the 
YPG/YPJ units. The United States began supplying arms to the Syrian Kurds in May of 2017 
(Arafat, 2017). U.S. Support enabled the YPG to rise as a prominent military force (Barnard and 
Hubbard, 2018). Because of Turkey’s designation of the YPG as a terrorist group, there were 
questions of whether President Trump would continue to back the Kurds or pull out due to its 
NATO ties with Turkey. In December of 2018, it was announced that the United States would be 
withdrawing from Syria. While this effort may preserve U.S.-Turkey relations, the Kurds, along 
with other potential partners of the United States, will likely feel skeptical about the Trump 
administration (Macaron, 2018). 
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Political Statements vs. Actions 
 The politicians of Iraqi Kurdistan have made statements and declarations regarding 
women’s rights. Prime Minister Barzani criticized religious leaders for practicing FGM, calling 
the measures “anti-women and anti-government. (Joly and Bakawan, 2016). Additionally, he has 
publicly supported stronger policies for gender related violence in November of 2013 (Joly and 
Bakawan, 2016). While the Prime Minister has made public statements, it is crucial to analyze 
what measures are being taken. The Kurdistan Regional Government conducts educational 
activities regarding FGM, including certifying midwives, conducting police trainings, and 
creating presentations for schools and the general public (Schwartz, 2015). Despite these 
measures, the question remains whether female activists or international actors motivated these 
decisions.  
A separate alternative explanation for the passing of pro-women legislation is a 
dedication to Kurdish nationalist Abdullah Öcalan rather than the women within the societies. At 
the beginning of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Öcalan stated that it was the Kurdish 
movement’s responsibility to liberate women (Marcus, 2007). The influence of Öcalan therefore 
ignited commitments to gender equality among the Kurds, specifically the PKK and the PYD. 
This research aims to examine whether or not these commitments were made in an effort to 
simply comply with Öcalan rather than to protect women themselves.  
When looking at the Kurdish situation, it is undeniable that Abdullah Öcalan has had a 
strong impact on Kurdish nationalism and the political pursuits of the Kurds. However, placing 
him as the sole instigator of the women’s rights movement is an exaggeration. Additionally, 
foreign support is not likely to adequately explain the roles of Kurdish women. After the 
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Peshmerga was formed in 1943, women began joining in the 1960s. This was long before the 
Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, or the de facto liberation of Rojava. Even though Rojava is newly de 
facto, the political structures that are in place have been in place since the early 1990s. 
Therefore, Kurdish women’s military involvement precedes United States’ interest in the Kurds.   
 
 
Measuring Women’s Rights 
Women’s rights are examined using several measures. To distinguish between what is 
women’s empowerment and what is not women’s empowerment, the status of women before and 
after women’s militarization is examined. Looking at women’s rights before they were heavily 
involved in the Peshmerga and the YPJ provides a baseline for comparison on how women’s 
rights have or have not evolved. Empowerment will be measured by looking at familial and 
political structures that encourage women’s autonomy.  
The theoretical framework and hypotheses discuss “positions of influence.” For the 
purpose of this research, these positions are women that are in public roles that involve broad 
levels of decision-making. This includes women that are in the job sector, are activists, or are 
politicians. Data on women in positions of influence who were not in the Peshmerga or YPJ are 
also included. This serves as a comparison for female ex-combatants’ societal engagement. 
Women attaining positions of influence is measured through Internet research of news sites.   
 Societal opportunities for civic engagement will focus on women that are in 
nongovernmental roles and are active in the workforce. Looking at women in the job sector 
offers insight into civic engagement, because women who work outside of the home are more 
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likely to mobilize politically (Ross, 2008). Women’s societal opportunities will look at what job 
opportunities and positions are newly available to women. This measure will exclude positions 
that were traditionally held by women before there were large numbers of women in the 
Peshmerga and the YPJ. 
  All of these forms of participation are measured through systematic Internet research. 
Data from Kurdish news sources including ANF English, Rudaw and Kurdistan 24 provide 
information on women in who are attaining positions of influence. Additionally, the Kurdistan 
Regional Government website has information on government structures and women who are 
members of the Kurdistan Parliament.  
 
 
Future Interviews with Peshmerga Women 
 Moving forward, future interviews with female ex-Peshmerga soldiers will be conducted. 
These surveys serve as a method to measure the experiences of women before, during and after 
their service. These primary accounts are crucial to understanding the full implications of 
women’s militarization on women’s public participation and legislation.The survey is 40 
questions long and is divided into three subsections. The first section asks questions background 
and familial attitudes. The purpose of these questions is to measure attitudes regarding gender 
equality and women’s empowerment before going into the Peshmerga. This sets a point for 
comparison regarding whether female ex-combatants’ opinions on gender equality changed 
during service.  
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The second section includes questions regarding time in the Peshmerga. These questions 
focus on instances of gender discrimination and training on Öcalan’s political ideologies. This 
section measures the training and exposure that ex-combatants, rather than female non-
combatants would receive. This information distinguishing them from other women is important 
to acknowledge, especially considering that the theoretical framework of this research focuses on 
the distinct experiences of female ex-combatants. The final question in this section asks to 
compare the number of women in commanding positions to the number of men. This measures 
the feasibility of women gaining positions of influence within the military.  
 The third section of the interview questions looks at attitudes and feelings of 
empowerment after Peshmerga service. Specifically, these questions focus on women’s beliefs 
that they are equipped for politics or the public sector. This section includes questions about 
employment and political activism of Peshmerga women. These questions correspond with the 
third and fourth linkages of the theoretical framework, which refer to societal opportunities for 
engagement and female ex-combatants tangibly attaining them. Additionally, questions about 
knowing Peshmerga women that try to be politically active or try to gain positions in activism 
will be used to measure whether Peshmerga are trying to gain positions of influence.  
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     WOMEN’S ROLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
To understand the extent to which women’s rights are being pursued, examining 
women’s roles and opportunities provides insight into women’s societal integration. There are a 
few sectors worthy of studying to determine whether women’s roles and rights are transforming. 
Whether or not women are taking on new employment or societal roles is indicative of changing 
attitudes towards women’s roles. In the 1990s, the PKK made efforts to include women by 
holding women’s assemblies (Knapp, Flack, & Ayboga, 2016). The following section looks at 
women’s roles within Kurdish systems of governance along with the private sector.  
 
 
Kurdish Women in Northern Syria before 2011 
After the Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, there was an influx of Kurds into Syria. The 
Kurds were given some freedom when it came to publishing and broadcasting in Syria during the 
French mandate. In the mid 1950s, the newly independent Syrian government seized and 
destroyed Kurdish publications (Hassanpour, Kangas and Chyet, 1996). Compared to the Kurds 
in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, Kurds in Syria had little role in early Kurdish Independence 
movements. This changed when the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria was founded in 1957. 
Nine years later, the party would split into the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria and The 
Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria. Throughout the seventies and eighties, each of 
the groups was split off into multiple parties. When Hafez al-Assad first took power in 1971, the 
Kurds began to experience newfound freedom. This eventually led to the creation of the Kurdish 
National Council in 2011. (al-Kati, 2019) 
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Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, a few resources for women in Syria existed. 
Women were granted the right to vote in 1949 and could stand in elections in 1953 (Kelly & 
Breslin, 2010). The General Women’s Union (GWU) was formed in 1967 for the purpose of 
developing women’s welfare and political participation (Bellafronto, 2004). In 2003, Syria 
passed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) with reservations for articles on issues including women passing her nationality onto 
her children, freedom of movement, equal rights in marriage, and the legal effect of child 
marriages (Kelly & Breslin, 2010).  
The Kurdish population in Syria was consistently discriminated against. In the 1960s 
roughly 120,000 Syrian Kurds were stripped of their citizenship. Kurdish political parties were 
also banned, and Kurdish language publications were limited. Although the Syrian government 
suppressed its Kurdish population, they were supportive of Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria. 
Iraqi Kurds were willing to support Syria in its regional conflict with Iraq. This allowed for PKK 
influence to take hold in Syria in the 1980s (Marcus, 2007). From this information, it can be 
gathered that Kurdish women in Syria were not guaranteed the same limited rights as Arab 
women. 
 
 
Women in Rojava 
 With the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Bashar al Assad withdrew the Syrian Army 
and government administration from parts of Northern Syria in July of 2012. This allowed for 
the Democratic Union Party (PYD) to step in and take control (Federici, 2015). A year later, the 
  35 
PYD announced a Kurdish Constitution. The constitution established three cantons within a 
Kurdish Autonomous region (Radpey, 2015). The canton structure is known as the People’s 
Council of West Kurdistan (MGRK). The MGRK is divided into four levels; communes, 
neighborhoods, districts, and the MGRK itself.  The region is divided into three cantons: Afrîn, 
Kobanî, and Cizîrê. The canton system was largely based off of Öcalan’s teachings of 
democratic confederalism. Additionally, the canton system utilizes Öcalan’s concepts of gender 
equality, as each canton has a male and female co-chair.  
 Other than the canton system, there are several organizations within Rojava that 
specialize in women’s rights and education. Kongreya Star, originally Yekitiya Star, was 
founded in 2005. It is an organization largely dedicated to the political education of women. 
Kongreya Star gives women a ten-day training program on the councils and communes. Kurdish 
women are not the only ethnic group active in women’s mobilization. The Syrian Women’s 
Association is an organization that includes women who are Kurds, Arabs, Yezidis, and Syrians. 
The association is not part of the larger MGRK council system, but it is focused on creating laws 
and forums for women’s liberation movements (Knapp, et al 2016).  
 The women in Rojava that are spearheading women’s revolution have a strong focus on 
youth. The Youth Confederation specifically focuses on educating women. Doz Kobaî, a 
member of the Youth Confederation, states that the organization educates women on “the 
position of women in society before patriarchy and what man has done to her in all the eras 
since” (Knapp et al., 2016). Other youth efforts include hosting a Conference on Young 
Revolutionary Women. Another organization focused on women’s rights is the Foundation of 
  36 
Free Women in Rojava. This foundation has developed women’s health centers and preschools 
(Knapp et al., 2016).  
 
 
Non-Governmental Employment in Rojava 
Outside of the co-leadership positions, women in Rojava take on roles in different 
sectors. The Women’s Economy directorate is one office that supports women’s employment. 
Their office supports 4,500 women in agricultural projects through training and assistance 
(Lynch, 2019). Women in Rojava are also able to obtain jobs. This includes serving as traffic 
cops and defense ministers (Lemmon, 2018). Last year, an all-women market was opened in 
Derik City in Rojava (Shekhani, 2018). The market director states that the market was developed 
for women who faced “social restrictions”, referring to women who did not hold certificates or 
who were housewives (Shekhani 2018). The Star Union of Women financially supports the 
market. Other than business, women are heavily involved in agriculture and education. In Afrîn, 
56 percent of workers in agriculture are women, and 70 percent of the members of teachers 
unions are women (Knapp, et al., 2016).  
 Women’s representation in the media is another cornerstone of society in Rojava. The 
Kurdish Women’s Press Association was founded in 2013. The association was formed in order 
to unionize female journalists. The founding conference for the association stated that a women’s 
radio station in Rojava would be established and a women’s media academy would be opened 
(Knapp et. al, 2016).   
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Opportunities and Structures for YPJ Women 
 There is a perceived connection between including women in the YPJ and the broader 
rights that are being granted to them in Syria. One YPJ commander claims that because of YPJ 
participation, women “play their role in media, health, economy, art and culture, language 
training, in every field (Darden, 2015 p. 51). The revolution in Rojava has often been described 
as not only a cultural revolution, but also a women’s revolution. One YPJ fighter states that 
“before the revolution, most Kurdish women were staying in their homes. Since I began fighting 
for my country, these attitudes have been changing” (Johnson, 2013). Because of the distinct 
inclusion of women in leadership in Rojava, it is unlikely that former YPJ women will return to 
their traditional roles. Now that Rojava has spaces for women in politics, education and health, 
women in the YPJ will now have more options for activism than they did prior to military 
service. 
 New YPJ recruits are given a military education that includes political thought, 
democratic autonomy and self-defense (Serhat & Servan 2015).  The women in the YPJ are 
exposed to the concept of jineolojî, or “women’s science” in their training camps (Knapp et al., 
2014). Jineolojî has also spread to women’s academies built by Yekîtiya Star. This implies that 
ideas of women’s liberation and determination are not confined to the YPJ. Instead, these are 
concepts that permeate all aspects of life in Rojava.  
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Kurdish Women in Iraq before ISIS 
Although the Peshmerga is older than the YPJ, the number of women involved has never 
been as high. Some of the legendary Peshmerga women from the 20th century include Margaret 
George and Hero Ibrahim Ahmad (Lortz, 2012; Goudsouzain, 2016). Women like George and 
Ahmad were in the minority at the time, and thus had limited influence on social change and 
political processes. It was not until 1995 that Colonel Nahida Rashid created the first women’s 
Peshmerga unit (Nilsson, 2018). Even with the creation of the women’s unit, women were not 
fully integrated and utilized until the emergence of the Islamic state in 2014 (Marouf, 2018). The 
few women that were active in the Peshmerga during the 1990s had limited success in gaining 
positions of influence. The exceptions to this were women who were married to men in power. 
Kafiya Suleiman, for example, is the wife of former leading commander Omer Fetah. She 
became the secretary general of the PUK Women’s Union in the early 1990s (Fischer-Tahir, 
2014). Therefore, the roles of Kurdish women in Iraq from the 1990s up until the early 2000s 
serve as a baseline for examining whether women’s inclusion in the Peshmerga has impacted 
women’s roles and rights. 
In the first Kurdistan parliament in 1992, six out of 105 members were women 
(McDonald, 2001). However, in its early history, the KRG still had more progressive stance than 
did Iraq. For instance, Iraq’s 1990 Penal Code, which legalized honor killings, was renounced in 
the KRG in 2000 (Brown & Romano, 2006). Additionally, although none of them were 
Peshmerga militants at the time, Kurdish women still engaged in peace activism during the 1994 
war between the PUK and KDP (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2011). Kurdish women were also involved in 
activism with the formation of the Independent Women’s Organization (IWO) in 1993. Its main 
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objectives were raising awareness of honor killings and establishing shelters for abused women 
(Mojab & Gorman, 2007). In 1992, 15,000 women signed a petition asking parliament to abolish 
polygamy and grant equal rights to inheritance and divorce, but the parliament rejected the 
proposals (Mojab, 2001). These examples show that even before women were involved in the 
Peshmerga, there were still some mechanisms, albeit limited ones, available for political 
representation and activism.  
 
 
Women in Iraqi Kurdistan Present Day 
Since its first parliamentary elections in 1992, women have been granted an increasing 
amount of access to politics and activism. Iraqi Kurdistan, similar to Rojava, has also created 
government structures for women. The political structure of Iraq is somewhat different from 
Rojava, as it is a semi-autonomous region in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan therefore has its own 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Kurdistan Parliament. Although not a fully 
autonomous state, Kurdistan does have representatives in several countries, including the United 
States, Iran, and Russia. Because of Kurdistan’s government structure and government, they 
have been able to build structures and institutions for women. In 2007, the Kurdistan Regional 
Government set up the General Directorate for Tracing Violence against Women (GDTVW). 
The goals of the GDTVW are collecting data, following up on legal cases, and raising awareness 
of violence against women (Joly & Bakawan, 2016).  
Within the KRG, there is a Women’s Rights Monitoring Board and a High Council of 
Women’s Affairs. The Ministry of the Interior has a general directorate to combat violence 
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against women, as well as their regional directorates in Erbil, Slemani and Duhok. In addition to 
these institutions, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for running women’s 
shelters, while the Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs aims to mobilize religious 
efforts against gender based violence. The Independent Human Rights Commission is a 
commission funded by the KRG. It has produced human rights reports and has worked with 
Doctors Without Borders to provide support for women in IDP camps (IHRCKR, 2017).    
Women have served as ministers in the KRG cabinet, although not to the same extent as 
men. In the sixth and seventh cabinets, only one of the nineteen ministers was a woman (Hardi, 
2013). In the current eighth cabinet, there are three female ministers out of a total of twenty-four 
(Kurdistan Regional Government). A woman, Dr. Rewas Faiq Hussein, is currently serving as 
the Speaker of Parliament. Before Dr. Hussein became the speaker, another woman, Val Fareed, 
served as the interim speaker in February 2019. This made her the first female speaker of the 
Kurdistan Parliament (Aldroubi, 2019). Muna Kahveci, a female representative from the 
Turkmen Reform Party, was elected as the second female deputy speaker (van Wilgenburg, 
2019). In the current Kurdistan parliament, there are 36 female parliamentarians out of a total 
111 (The Baghdad Post, 2018). One of these 36 women, Hazhan Kwestani, is a former 
Peshmerga soldier (Kurdistan Parliament).   
  Despite the political support structures for women, Kurdish women that are not part of 
political institutions face challenges. Kurdish women activists that are not sponsored by the main 
political parties of the KRG face their own challenges (al-Ali & Pratt, 2011). Both the KDP and 
the PUK have their own offshoots that are concerned with women’s rights. The Kurdistan 
Women’s Union (KWU) is the KDP’s women’s organization. The KWU was founded in 1952 
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and offers numerous resources for women, including job training, health care centers and 
education services (The Kurdish Project). The KRG recognizes that despite the inclusion of 
women in different sectors, “social and cultural considerations continue to restrict the equal 
access of women to resources and leadership positions in society.” (Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
2020, p. 11) 
 
 
Non-Governmental Employment in Iraqi Kurdistan 
 Outside of politics, Kurdish women are less active in the private sector. A 2014 World 
Bank Survey found that only 11 percent of women were active in the labor force (Dexter, 2016). 
In comparison, eighty percent of women in the workforce in Iraqi Kurdistan work in government 
(Kurdistan Region of Iraq 2020). More than half of non-working women want to work. A World 
Bank study found that most individuals in Iraqi Kurdistan had positive attitudes toward women 
working. In fact, over 70% of men and women surveyed found it acceptable for women to work 
in the private sector. The same study found that the constraints that women faced were lack of 
access to child care and a lack of job security after maternity leave (World Bank, 2019).  
The Ministry of Planning in the KRG released a document titled Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq 2020: A Vision for the Future which includes concerns for women. One of the policy 
priorities outlined is “Helping women enter the labor market and succeed”. Under this heading, 
the policy details measures that must be taken to include women. The document emphasizes that 
government statements and actions will “show that women deserve equal opportunities in the 
labor market” (p. 17). Including this policy objective demonstrates that the KRG is both aware of 
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and committed to including women in the private sector. By outlining and implementing policy 
objectives, the KRG aims to diversify and include women more broadly in the workforce.  
 Another structure that exists for women in Iraqi Kurdistan are non-governmental 
organizations. Women began organizing and building NGOs in the late 1990s. Although they 
were dedicated to their causes, the women that started these efforts were underpaid and 
inexperienced. Within the past ten years however, there have been more substantial efforts to 
train and educate NGO leaders (Hardi, 2013).  
 
 
Opportunities and Structures for Peshmerga Women 
 Female Peshmerga soldiers have expressed concerns about whether or not they will 
maintain their positions after the fight against ISIS concludes (Marouf, 2018). Prior to the 
emergence of ISIS, the women that were active in the Peshmerga typically served in support 
roles. This included running women’s shelters and maintaining border security. With the 
onslaught of the Islamic State, women began to take on more combat roles. Because of the shifts 
in women’s roles, female Peshmerga soldiers are now questioning what their roles will be like in 
the forces post ISIS.  
 Some of the women of the Peshmerga are motivated to pursue political and social 
activism. These advocacy positions include acting as a lawyer to stop domestic violence and 
volunteer work (Nilsson, 2018). Because of these newfound roles, many Peshmerga women 
believe that women’s militarization has promoted changes for gender equality (Nilsson, 2018).   
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 Women that are currently in the Peshmerga have a few examples to look at when 
determining what post Peshmerga life will hold. Amineh Kakabaveh is an Iranian Kurdish ex-
Peshmerga fighter who sought asylum in Sweden in the 1990s. Kakabaveh then became a 
Swedish Member of Parliament in 2008 and maintains her position (Branchereau 2018). Hero 
Ibrahim Ahmad was also a Peshmerga fighter, but her service was in the 1980s against the 
Baathist regime. As the former first lady of Iraq, Ahmad is still influential in the PUK. However, 
she has been subject to personal attacks from patriarchal sects of Kurdish society over the past 
three decades (Goudsouzian 2016). Pakhshan Zangana is another former Peshmerga soldier who 
currently serves as the head of the High Council for Women’s Affairs (Rahman, 2019). 
Looking at Kakabaveh and Ahmad, it seems as if Peshmerga women are positioned to 
enter politics after service. With this being said, Kakabaveh and Ahmad were Peshmerga soldiers 
long before the rise of ISIS and the dramatic increase of the recruitment of women. Additionally, 
there are women within Iraqi Kurdistan who became politically active without direct Peshmerga 
involvement. However, many of these women have fathers or husbands who are active in 
politics.  Comparatively, there is a greater percentage of women that are in KRG legislature than 
there are women in the Peshmerga. This shows that armed group participation is not the only 
way for women to pursue political involvement (Darden et al. 2019, p. 52).  
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WOMEN AND ELECTIONS 
Although Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan differ in government structure, they each present 
opportunities for women to participate in government processes. The canton structure of Rojava 
is built up of local municipalities, in which every position at every government level in Rojava 
has a female equivalent in authority. Rojava is commonly referred to as a “woman’s revolution,” 
as seen by the political activism of women like Hevi Ibrahim, the prime minister of the Afrin 
Canton (Civiroglu, 2014). As previously mentioned, Iraqi Kurdistan has a parliamentary system 
that women can serve in. The flowing section will examine the structures that are present for 
women and whether they carry out their intended purposes.  
 
 
Effectiveness of Women and Elections 
Within governments that have gender quotas, there are questions of the effectiveness of 
mandatory involvement of women. The central question for women’s involvement is whether 
women’s participation translates to women’s representation. In Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a 
mandatory thirty percent quota for women in parliament. Regarding parliamentary elections in 
Iraqi Kurdish parliament, there were 241 female candidates competing for representation in the 
2018 election. Thirty-four women had served in the previous term. The KDP had 12 female 
members of parliament, followed by eight in the Gorran party, six in the PUK, three in the KIU 
and two in Komal. The Turkmen parties each had one female member of parliament, while the 
Christian parties had two (Ahmad, 2018). In July of 2018, Kurdish parliament amended a law 
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that requires one of the three leading members of parliament—the speaker and the two deputies, 
to be a woman (Ali, 2019).  
Women who run for office in Iraqi Kurdistan are subject to their own set of challenges. In 
the Iraqi parliament, Kurdish female candidates have been the targets of fake sex tapes and 
revealing photos in efforts to undermine their aspirations (Edwards, 2018). Although the quota 
requires that there are women in parliament, critics claim that the result is hardly 
representational. Hezha Khan, a women’s activist in Iraqi Kurdistan, doubts that the seats in 
parliament are spread evenly among the social classes. Instead, she believes that most of the 
seats go to women who are related to men that are in power (Edwards, 2018). This implies that 
familial ties, rather than Peshmerga service, is a greater determinant for a woman’s likelihood to 
be in politics. Dr. Choman Hardi, the founder of the Center for Gender and Development Studies 
at the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani, is critical of the thirty percent quota in the 
Kurdistan parliament. Regarding women in parliament, Hardi states  “some people believe that 
they were chosen intentionally to be ineffective so that they don’t threaten the system” (van 
Wilgenburg, 2019). Because of these negative experiences, political parties may have trouble 
encouraging women to run for office. 
 
 
Laws for Women’s Equality 
Along with passing gender quotas, both the MGRK in Nothern Syria and the KRG have 
passed legislation that is inclusive of women and women’s rights. Rojava’s Constitution makes 
numerous references to the status of women. Iraqi Kurdistan has passed two major legislative 
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acts that outlaw female genital mutilation and has banned child marriage. The passing of these 
laws demonstrates societal attitudes toward women’s rights, and whether or not governments are 
supportive in outlawing regressive practices. In addition to the creation of laws, it is important to 
note what language and definitions are included. Both Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan have laws that 
received general support and clearly outline definitions for terminology such as gender equality 
and domestic violence.  
 
 
Legal Frameworks in Rojava 
 In Rojava, the concept of gender equality can be seen throughout its legal system. The 
Constitution of the Rojava Cantons was passed in 2014.  Women and gender are discussed in 
several different articles. Article 23 a states that “everyone has the right to express their ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and gender rights.” Article 28 explicitly states that the “Charter guarantees the 
effective realization of equality of women and mandates public institutions to work towards the 
elimination of gender discrimination.”  It is in Article 47 that the constitution lays out that the 
Legislative Assembly must be composed of at least forty percent of either sex. In addition to this, 
men with histories of domestic violence or polygamy are excluded from organizations (Dirik, 
2014).  
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Legal Frameworks in Iraqi Kurdistan 
Similar to the Rojava canton system, the Kurdistan Parliament has also passed legislation 
regarding women’s rights. The Kurdistan Parliament passed Act No. 15 on November 3rd, 2008. 
This legislation was an amendment to the Personal Status Law that was initially passed in 1959. 
The first article defines marriage as a “voluntary contract” and states that husbands must have 
the permission of his first wife in order to marry a second wife. The law outlaws forced 
marriage, and states that any relative who breaks this can be sentenced to two to five years in 
prison. The Law against Domestic Violence was adopted in 2011. The bill received support from 
68 of the 111 parliamentarians, securing a majority (Khalife, 2010).  The law provides a 
definition for domestic violence that extends to physical and psychological harm, as well as 
deprivation of liberties. Thirteen different examples of domestic violence are outlined, including 
female genital mutilation, forced marriage, and marriage of minors.  
The Law against Domestic Violence was subject to media attention when Mullah Ismael 
Sosaae, a religious leader, demanding that Prime Minister Barzani refuse to sign the bill into law. 
Barzani complied with not signing the bill, but he did allow for it to go into effect when it was 
published in the Government’s Official Gazette in August of 2011 (Iraqi Kurdistan: Law banning 
FGM not being enforced, 2012). One year later, the Supreme Council for Women Affairs in the 
KRG passed the National Strategy to Confront Violence against Women in Kurdistan. This is a 
five-year plan that outlined goals of passing more legislation for women and increasing women’s 
political participation (National Strategy to Combat Violence Against Women, 2012).  
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Applying Women’s Rights Legislation 
 As previously mentioned in the theory, only looking at legal frameworks does not 
provide enough insight into women’s rights. Rather, this must be combined with studying the 
application of laws. One of the main challenges of applying the laws in Iraqi Kurdistan is an 
overall lack of awareness of the people. The Warvin Organization surveyed 1000 women in Iraqi 
Kurdistan in 2013. When asked about awareness of the Combatting Violence against women act, 
43 percent of women were not aware of the law at all. Twenty eight percent of women knew that 
there was such a law, while 18 percent were aware of some of the articles and only 11 percent 
were fairly aware of the law. The same report stated that 42 percent of women had “never seen 
any woman” benefit from the law, 25 percent of women had “rarely seen” women benefit, 24 
percent had “seen some women benefit,” and only nine percent saw “many women benefit” (Al-
Massala Organization for Human Development, 2013).  
Similarly, a UN survey was conducted in Erbil on opinions on female genital mutilation. 
Sixty-eight percent of people surveyed stated that they were against the practice of FGM. Of 
these people surveyed, 60 percent of them said that they were unaware that FGM had even been 
outlawed (Ford, 2014). The 2011 “Law of Combatting Violence Within the Family,” stated that a 
special court would be established for familial violence. However, this court has yet to be 
established, allowing practices like female genital mutilation to be continued without punishment 
(Hardi, 2013). One reason why the KRG has struggled to implement the law is the number of 
mothers who perform FGM on their daughters. These women are less likely to file complaints 
against their parents (Agence-France Presse, 2019).  
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Along with all of this, some religious leaders are still in favor or FGM. A 2018 study 
interviewing 29 religious leaders in the Erbil governate found that most of the interviewees did 
not support outlawing FGM. The participants were not directly asked if they were aware of the 
existing law, but only one participant referenced the existence of the law (Ahmed, Kareem, 
Shabila & Mzori, 2018). In 2019, the KRG announced a new plan to eradicate FGM by 2028. 
The plan includes the cooperation of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, and Ministry 
of Religious Affairs (Sulaivany, 2019).  
 
 
Violence against Women, Child Marriages and Honor Killings  
 Despite the laws that are in place to protect women in Kurdistan and Rojava, they are still 
subject to illegal practices. Breaking down and looking at instances of violence, child marriages, 
female genital mutilation, and honor killings provide insights into women’s status and whether 
laws are being enforced. These three measures were chosen because they have roots in Kurdish 
culture. 
 A 2013 study in Erbil found that over half of women surveyed were subject to emotion, 
physical or sexual violence from their husbands (Al-Atrushi, Tawil, Shabila and Hadithi, 2013). 
In 2015, there were 7,436 registered complaints of violence against women in Iraqi Kurdistan, 
compared to 6,673 complaints in the previous year (Parvaz, 2016).  A CEDAW Shadow Report 
was conducted in 2014. The report found that child marriages had increased from 2003 through 
2014 in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report speculates that economic development and tradition were two 
driving factors for the increase of child marriages. In the year 2017, there were fourteen reported 
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cases of honor killings in Iraqi Kurdistan (Dolemari, 2018). Although women are protected from 
honor killings by law, cultural undertones of the practice enable its prevalence.  
 
 
Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan 
Compared to other countries where FGM Is practiced, Iraq has relatively low rates 
(Ahmed, Shabu, and Shabila 2019). Female genital mutilation is still practiced in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, but studies indicate that the practice is actually decreasing. In 2018, a UNICEF survey 
found that 37.5% of women had been mutilated, compared to 58.5% in 2014 (Agence France-
Presse, 2019). A 2011 study using 1,508 females aged 6 months to 20 years of age was 
conducted among the provinces of Erbil, Sulaimaniyah and Duhok. The practice of FGM was 
reported in about 37% or participants from Erbil, 29% in Sulaimaniyah, and 4% in Duhok 
(Saleem, Othman, Fattah, Hazim and Adnan, 2013). Salem et al. (2013) also examined attitudes 
about FGM from women who had already undergone the practice. Their findings state that 51% 
of participants with no education favored FGM, but only 27% of those with basic education and 
18% with a high school education favored it (Saleem, et al. 2013). Similarly, a 2013 study using 
1987 women from ages 15-49 was conducted in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan. Yasin, Al-Tawil, Shabila 
and Hadithi, (2013) found that the practice was significantly associated with women’s 
employment status. The findings from these studies suggest that women’s level of education and 
employment status affect the likelihood of women undergoing FGM.  
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Supporters and Dissidents of Women’s Rights 
To trace reasons why violations against women are still carried out, it is important to 
determine which figures in power either support or speak out against violence. Similar to the 
traditional nature of honor killings, FGM may be encouraged by clerics and scholars to preserve 
customs. In 2015 an Iraqi Kurdish media network interviewed Sunni preacher Mullah Ali Kalak. 
Kalak at the time encouraged Kurdish Muslims to continue the practice of FGM despite the laws 
prohibiting it. After speaking with a representative from Gender, an NGO in Erbil, Kalak agreed 
to stop practicing FGM and cease from encouraging others to defy the KRG (Schwartz, 2015).  
While some men in public positions like Kalak may encourage FGM, it is usually women 
that support and even carry out the practice. A 2014 UNICEF survey found that 75% of women 
saw their mothers as being supportive of cutting (Agence France-Press, 2015). This can prevent 
FGM from being reported, as women may feel hesitant to report parents for breaking the law.  
Unlike Kalak, there are cases of men in power who support movements for women’s 
rights. Even prior to FGM being outlawed in Iraqi Kurdistan, the High Committee for Issuing 
Fatwas at the Kurdistan Islamic Scholars Union issued a fatwa stating that Islam does not require 
FGM (Iraqi Kurdistan: Law Banning FGM Not Being Enforced, 2012). Outside of religion, 
politicians have also voiced their support for women’s rights. Male politicians are overall less 
likely to be against changing gender roles for women. Rather, men that are in lower positions 
typically felt threatened by women’s new roles (al-Ali and Pratt, 2010).  
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LIMITATIONS      With the methodology used for this study, there are several limitations. The Internet 
research that was gathered is based off of secondhand accounts. Therefore, there are possibilities 
for bias from journalists and reporters. Additionally, the government websites for the KRG and 
Rojava will also support a very specific narrative that is inclusive of women. However, an 
advantage of using news sources is that they will offer up to date information on political and 
social developments. The legal documents and laws that are passed will be useful in determining 
when, why and how legislation was passed, and will offer little to no bias.  
The future interviews conducted with primary sources offers an in depth analysis of 
women’s lives before, during, and after their Peshmerga service. With this being said, the 
answers given in the interview are subject to the interviewees’ personal biases. The subjects of 
the study may feel protective of the Peshmerga, and their service. This might lead to a skewed 
perspective of the rights of women and whether or not they are achieving true equality through 
military service.  
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DISCUSSION 
Women in Rojava and women in Iraqi Kurdistan have faced different histories and 
therefore have different experiences regarding gender equality. In Rojava, it easier to make a 
connection between an increase in women’s rights and the creation of the Women’s Protection 
Units (YPJ). This is because many gender equality initiatives took place concurrently with the 
establishment of the YPJ. In Iraqi Kurdistan however, the situation is somewhat different. 
Although women are able to serve in the Peshmerga and hold political office, it is difficult to 
establish a link between the two. There are a few standout cases of former Peshmerga women 
entering politics, but for the most part, the roles of ex-Peshmerga remains to be seen. It can be 
argued that through the laws passed by the KRG and the initiatives taken by Kurdish NGOs, 
Iraqi Kurds support efforts toward ensuring women’s equality. With this being said, Iraqi 
Kurdistan has not seen as dramatic of a surge in women’s activism and political participation as 
has Rojava.  
 It is important to also note the vast differences between the Kurds in Iraq and the Kurds 
in Syria. Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan emerged in very different socio-political conditions (Cemgil 
& Hoffman, 2016). For instance, the Kurdistan Regional Government does not prescribe to the 
same notions of democratic confederalism that Rojava does. The Kurdish region in Iraq is 
governed on “socially conservative, tribal lines within a capitalist economic framework” (Gupta, 
2017). Therefore, it is possible that Rojava simply had the right mechanisms and opportunities 
that allowed gender equality to develop.  
 Along with differing political structures in both Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria, the 
role of class greatly differs between in region. Historically, women in Iraqi Kurdistan have been 
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able to gain influence through their husbands and families. This can be seen in present day Iraqi 
Kurdistan, with both female ex-Peshmerga soldiers and non-combatants. In Rojava however, 
there is a greater number of women who do not have family connections that are active in 
leadership. Therefore, it can be seen that the “women’s revolution” in Northern Syria is an 
intersectional one, as positions of influence are not reserved for only upper class women.  
 It is clear that both the Kurds in Iraq and the Kurds in Syria are heavily influenced by 
Öcalan’s ideals of women’s autonomy. It is unlikely that the Peshmerga and the YPJ have only 
used women to support a Kurdish nationalist agenda. This can be seen in the efforts that are 
being put forth by the canton structure and the KRG. If the Kurds were simply using women for 
a nationalist struggle, they would not be able to serve in the Kurdistan Parliament or have 
positions of influence in Rojava.  
Referring back to the hypotheses, H1 is correct in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. Many 
women formerly active in the Peshmerga that have been successful in pursuing political careers 
have been married to influential figures. Women that do not have these connections have 
struggled to become politically involved. In this case, military service does not seem to have a 
strong impact on women’s political involvement, since there are non-Peshmerga women in the 
KRG. The gender politics of Northern Syria, however, differ. Women in Northern Syria are 
included in more levels of decision making than women in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Looking at H2, it can be argued that this is not necessarily the case for Iraqi Kurdistan. 
As previously stated, not all women that that are active in the Kurdistan Regional Government 
have a history of Peshmerga service. Therefore, in Iraqi Kurdistan, women’s militarization is not 
the only mechanism for women to pursue social and political change. The same cannot be said 
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for Kurdish women in Rojava. In Rojava, the reason why there is so much change is because 
women are included in all levels of decision-making. The women that are active in the YPJ have 
a strong link to the politics, governance and overall activism in Rojava.  
 
 
Liberation for Kurdish Women: What Next? 
Through the efforts of Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan, it can be seen that each government and the 
organizations within them have gender equality agenda. With this in mind, there is still room for 
improvement in both Rojava and Iraqi Kurdistan. Some of the strongest criticism against the 
Kurdistan Regional Government is that they are not doing enough to enforce laws regarding 
gender equality. Women that are active in KRG politics are also subject to their own sets of 
challenges. Critics assert that many women in parliament only gained these positions due to their 
political affiliations rather than their actual abilities (van Wilgenburg, 2019).  
Comparatively, there is less global criticism of the women in Northern Syria. Part of this 
might be because it is simply more difficult to obtain exact numbers regarding female genital 
mutilation and honor killings in the region.  There are still women in Rojava that are not active in 
organizations and that are economically dependent on their husbands (Knapp et al., 2016). The 
demographic that faces the most challenges are married women. The revolution and new 
positions that women are able to gain go against traditional gender roles that their husbands are 
accustomed to.  
 Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria are both in stages of political change, so there remains 
much more to be seen in the upcoming future. This is especially true for the drastic changes in 
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Rojava. Idris Nassan, a politician in Rojava, questions whether or not returning male refugees 
“will be able to change their mentality since they have not been part of the cultural revolution” 
(Argentieri, 2016). It remains to be seen what societal attitudes toward women in positions of 
influence will be like after the Syrian Civil War. In Iraqi Kurdistan, initiatives for women’s 
equality have developed more gradually, and also independently from women’s involvement in 
the Peshmerga.  It can then be argued that legislation and reforms for women’s equality are more 
stable in Iraqi Kurdistan than in Rojava.  
  
  57 
CONCLUSION 
 Studying women in Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria offers distinct insights into how 
female militarization impacts gender roles in a society. The case of the Kurds varies greatly from 
most revolutionary groups. Whereas many nationalist movements utilize women for their cause 
and afterward abandon women’s rights, the Kurds have consistently supported their public 
claims of gender equality. This is evident in governmental and organizational efforts in both 
Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern Syria.  
 While it can be said that the Kurds practice what they espouse, there are still further steps 
to be taken to ensure women’s equality. In Iraqi Kurdistan, there is a low percentage of women 
that are employed in nongovernmental positions. A similar problem exists in Rojava, but instead 
of just a lack of employed women, the region suffers from a low amount of workers due to the 
Syrian Civil War and the rise of the Islamic State (Assad, 2019). Other than issues of 
employment, female genital mutilation, honor killings and violence against women are still 
carried out in Iraqi Kurdistan.   
 Avenues for future research include more in depth analysis for women in the YPJ. 
Depending on the direction of the Syrian Civil War, it would be worthwhile to study what 
Kurdish women’s rights will look like in Northern Syria post-conflict. This research adds 
insights to both the discussion of gender equality among the Kurds in Syria and Iraq, as well as 
to theories on women’s militarization and women’s rights. 
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